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LEGISLATIVE OATHS AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN HONG KONG 
(2017) 47 Hong Kong Law Journal 1-15 
Po Jen Yap and Eric Chan 
In this comment, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's decision to 
disqualify two newly elected members of the Legislative Council from 
office. While we accept that the judiciary is empowered under Art 104 of 
the Basic Law to determine whether an oath taken is valid, it is our view 
that after the oath is judicially deemed invalid, it should be left to the 
President of LegCo to determine whether the lawmaker is to be denied a 
second chance of retaking the oath and be disqualified. First, the CA held 
that para 2(3) of the relevant Interpretation by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress “automatically disqualified [the pair of 
lawmakers] from assuming their offices”, but the term “automatic” or 
“automatically” is found nowhere in the Interpretation. The Interpretation 
only uses the term “forthwith”, which means “without delay”, and it 
would not be inconsistent with the Interpretation for the CA to punt the 
issue over to the President to proceed with the disqualification 
expeditiously. Second, reading ss19 and 21 of the Oaths and Declarations 
Ordinance (Cap 11) together, we argue that a lawmaker can only be 
disqualified for declining to take the requisite oath if he had not taken a 
valid oath after a reasonable time had elapsed. Therefore, the lawmaker is 
not disqualified “automatically” on the first occasion where he declined to 
take the requisite oath. Third, the principle of non-intervention in the 
internal process of LegCo applies herein. Whilst the courts have 
jurisdiction to determine whether the President has the general power to 
grant or deny a newly elected LegCo member the opportunity of retaking 
the requisite oath after the original attempt was judicially deemed invalid, 
the courts will not exercise jurisdiction to determine the specific occasion 
or manner of exercise of this power by the President. Finally, if the 
Interpretation is treated as a piece of legislation instead of a judicial 
decision, and if Hong Kong courts were to approach this legislation using 
common law principles of statutory interpretation, the presumption 
against retrospectivity of legislation applies; and on the facts of this case, 
this Interpretation would not operate retrospectively to events that 
predated its announcement.  
1. Introduction 
In Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v President of the 
Legislative Council,1 the Court of Appeal (CA) unanimously upheld the lower court's 
ruling that Leung Chung-hang Sixtus and Yau Waiching, two newly elected members 
of the Legislative Council (LegCo), were disqualified from assuming their offices 
after they declined to take the Legislative Council Oath (LegCo Oath).2  
																																								 																				
1 [2017] 1 HKLRD 460.  
2 The LegCo Oath is prescribed under s 16(d) and Sch 2 of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance 
(Cap 11) (ODO). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046359 
In essence, the CA's reasoning was as follows. First, Art 104 of the Basic Law (BL) 
established a “constitutional requirement”3 that members of the LegCo must, in 
accordance with law, swear to uphold the BL and swear allegiance to the Special 
Administrative Region when assuming office. Second, para 2(3) of the Interpretation 
of Art 104 of the BL by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(NPCSC) sets out “automatic disqualification”4 as the consequence when an oath 
taker declines to take the relevant oath. Third, s 21(a) of the ODO--the implementing 
law of Art 104 of the BL--states that an office holder shall vacate his office if he 
declines or neglects to take the relevant oath,5  and such vacation of office is 
“automatic”.6 Fourth, the courts have the power and responsibility to determine 
whether a constitutional requirement under the BL is complied with,7 and the court's 
role herein is not displaced by the common law principle of non-intervention in the 
internal process of LegCo.8 Fifth, the Interpretation applies retrospectively to the 
oaths previously taken by Leung and Yau as it sets out the true meaning of Art 104 of 
the BL “from day one”.9 Therefore, as Leung and Yau had failed to comply with the 
above constitutional requirement by declining to take the LegCo Oath,10 they were 
“automatically disqualified forthwith from assuming their offices”11 under para 2(3) 
of the Interpretation12 and shall vacate their offices under s 21 of the ODO.13 
Accordingly, there was “no question of allowing them to retake the LegCo Oath”.14  
The material facts of the case may be briefly stated. In September 2016, Leung and 
Yau were elected as members of the LegCo in their respective geographical 
constituencies. On 12 October 2016, they were requested at the first meeting of the 
LegCo to take the LegCo Oath. Leung and Yau purported to do so, but they departed 
from the statutory text of the LegCo Oath by using terms such as “Hong Kong nation” 
and “Sheen-na”15 in their oral affirmations. On 18 October 2016, the President of the 
Legislative Council (the President) gave a written ruling that the oaths taken by Leung 
and Yau were invalid,16 but he was prepared to allow them to “take their oath afresh 
																																								 																				
3 Chief Executive (.n 1 above), [26]. 
4 Ibid.,[29]. 
5 Ibid.,[30]. 
6 Ibid.,[44]. 
7 Ibid.,[25]. 
8 Ibid.,[31]. 
9 Ibid.,[53]. 
10 Ibid.,[41]. 
11 Ibid.,[42]. 
12 Paragraph 2(3) of the Interpretation reads: 
“An oath taker is disqualified forthwith from assuming the public office specified in the Article if he 
or she declines to take the oath. An oath taker who intentionally reads out words which do not accord 
with the wording of the oath prescribed by law, or takes the oath in a manner which is not sincere or 
not solemn, shall be treated as declining to take the oath. The oath so taken is invalid and the oath taker 
is disqualified forthwith from assuming the public office specified in the Article.” 
13 Chief Executive(n 1 above), [42].Section 21 of the ODO reads: 
“Any person who declines or neglects to take an oath duly requested which he is required to take by 
this Part, shall- (a) if he has already entered on his office, vacate it, and (b) if he has not entered on his 
office, be disqualified from entering on it”. 
14 Chief Executive (n 1 above), [42]. 
15 “Shee-na” is a derogatory term used by the Japanese to refer to the Chinese during the Second 
World War. 
16 Andrew Leung, “President's Ruling on the Validity of the Legislative Council Oath Taken by Six 
Members at the Council Meeting of 12 October 2016”(18 October 2016), para 12(a), available at 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/pre_rul/pre20161018-ref-e.pdf (visited 17 February 2017). 
at a Council meeting if they put forward their requests in writing”.17 On the same day, 
the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice commenced proceedings against the 
President and the two lawmakers, seeking declarations inter alia that the invalid oaths 
taken by Leung and Yau disqualified them from assuming their offices as LegCo 
members and the President had no power to re-administer their oaths. But on 7 
November 2016, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) delivered its ruling, the 
NPCSC issued an Interpretation of Art 104 of the BL,18 which inter alia provides 
that“[i]f the oath taken [by a public officer specified in Article 104 of the BL] is 
determined as invalid, no arrangement shall be made for retaking the oath”.19 The CFI 
eventually held that Leung and Yau had declined to take the LegCo Oath and s 21 of 
the ODO should therefore operate to disqualify them as LegCo members,20 without 
requiring any further steps to be taken by the President or any other person.21 The CA 
dismissed Leung and Yau's appeal.  
In this comment, we disagree with the CA's decision to disqualify Leung and Yau 
from office. While we accept that the judiciary is empowered under Art 104 of the BL 
to determine whether an oath taken is valid, it is our view that after the oath is 
judicially deemed invalid, it should be left to the President to determine whether the 
lawmaker is to be denied a second chance of retaking the oath and be disqualified.  
First, the CA held that para 2(3) of the Interpretation “automatically disqualified [the 
pair of lawmakers] forthwith from assuming their offices”,22 but the term “automatic” 
or “automatically” is found nowhere in the Interpretation. The Interpretation only uses 
the term “forthwith”, which means “without delay”,23 and it would not be inconsistent 
with the Interpretation for the CA to punt the issue over to the President to proceed 
with the disqualification expeditiously. Second, reading ss 1924 and 21 of the ODO 
together, we argue that a lawmaker can only be disqualified for declining to take the 
requisite oath if he had not taken a valid oath after a reasonable time had elapsed, and 
not “automatically”25 on the first occasion where he declined to take the requisite 
oath. Third, the principle of non-intervention in the internal process of LegCo applies 
herein. Whilst the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the President has the 
general power to grant or deny a newly elected LegCo member the opportunity of 
retaking the requisite oath after the original attempt was judicially deemed invalid, the 
																																								 																				
17 Ibid., para 7. 
18 Interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (7 
November 2016), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A115!en@2016-11-
07T00:00:00/longTitle?elpid=254663 (visited 17 March 2017). 
19 Ibid., para 2(4). 
20 Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v President of the Legislative 
Council [2016] 6 HKC 417, [47] (CFI). 
21 Ibid., [100]. The CFI also held that the outcome as far as Leung and Yau are concerned would be 
“the same with or without referring to the terms of the Interpretation”: Ibid., [120]. 
22 Chief Executive (n 1 above), [42]. 
23 Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds), Concise Oxford English Dictionary(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 11th ed., 2006) p 560. 
24  Section 19 of the ODO reads: 
“A member of the Legislative Council shall, as soon as possible after the commencement of his term of 
office, take the Legislative Council Oath which- (a) if taken at the first sitting of the session of the 
Legislative Council immediately after a general election of all members of the Council and before the 
election of the President of the Council, shall be administered by the Clerk to the Council; (b) if taken 
at any other sitting of the Council, shall be administered by the President of the Council or any member 
acting in his place.” 
25 Chief Executive (n 1 above), [42]. 
courts will not exercise jurisdiction to determine the specific occasion or manner of 
exercise of this power by the President. Finally, if the NPCSC Interpretation is treated 
as a piece of legislation instead of a judicial decision, and if Hong Kong courts were 
to approach this legislation using common law principles of statutory interpretation, 
the presumption against retrospectivity of legislation applies; and on the facts of this 
case, this Interpretation would not operate retrospectively to events that predated its 
announcement.  
2. Interplay between Art 104, the NPCSC Interpretation and the ODO 
The CA justified its duty to disqualify the lawmakers on the basis that it was its 
constitutional responsibility to “adjudicat[e] on the consequence of a failure to meet 
the constitutional requirement”26 imposed under Art 104 of the BL. As reasoned by 
the Court, Art 104 of the BL requires key public officials to swear allegiance to the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region before they can assume office, and it is for 
the courts to determine whether a constitutional requirement has been satisfied.27 A 
fortiori, it must be for the courts-- and not the oath administrator--to determine 
whether a valid oath as required under Art 104 of the BL has been taken.28 Otherwise, 
if a LegCo member is “wrongly ruled by the Clerk or President [of the LegCo] to 
have failed to comply with article 104 [of the BL] and disqualified”,29 that member 
would have no relief.  
With respect, the CA's concerns are legitimate but misplaced. Undoubtedly, for the 
reasons given by the Court, the judiciary must be empowered under Art 104 of the BL 
to determine whether an oath taken is valid. If no judicial safeguards are in place, a 
delinquent and partisan oath administrator can unilaterally remove lawmakers duly 
elected by the people. Hence, in any dispute, upon a final judicial ruling that the oath 
taken is valid, the matter should rest henceforth and that lawmaker must be permitted 
to assume office.  
On the other hand, it is our view that if the court decides that the oath taken is invalid, 
it should be left to the President to determine if the lawmaker is to be denied a second 
chance of retaking the oath and be disqualified. (On the facts of this dispute, if the 
Interpretation has retrospective effect--an issue that we will discuss later--the 
President would have no discretion but be legally bound by the Interpretation to 
disqualify Leung and Yau.) But unfortunately, the CA took the view that the 
disqualification of the said legislators was automatic, and it is to its reasons we now 
turn.  
First, the CA held that para 2(3) of the Interpretation “automatically disqualified [the 
pair of lawmakers] forthwith from assuming their offices”.30 This is an unfortunate 
judicial sleight of hand .The term “automatic” or “automatically” is found nowhere in 
																																								 																				
26 Ibid., [31]. 
27 Ibid., [32]. 
28 Ibid., [33]. 
29 Ibid., [74] (Lam V-P). 
30 Ibid., [42]. 
the Interpretation. The Interpretation only uses the term “forthwith”,31 which means 
“without delay”,32 and it would not be inconsistent with the Interpretation for the CA 
to punt the issue over to the President to proceed with the disqualification 
expeditiously. We must emphasise that the Interpretation is actually silent on who 
should do the disqualifying. In fact, the courts are not even mentioned in the 
Interpretation.  
Second, the CA held that s 21 of the ODO provides that: 
“any person who declines․․․to take an oath duly requested which he is 
required to take by this Part shall․․․if he has already entered on his office, 
vacate it, and if he has not entered on his office, be disqualified from 
entering on it”. 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that s 21 not only did not allow the two lawmakers to 
retake their oaths,33 their removal from office was “automatic”.34 On the Court's 
reading of s 21 of the ODO, any lawmaker who declines to take the oath shall be 
automatically disqualified or removed from office. If the Court was correct, this 
would mean that lawmakers who had declined to take the oath at the first available 
opportunity after being duly requested to do so, merely because they or their family 
members suddenly require emergency medical attention right before they were to be 
sworn in, those lawmakers too would be automatically disqualified from office. But 
surely this cannot be right.  
More importantly, this would not even be what the ODO mandates. Section 19 of the 
ODO merely requires a member of the LegCo to take the oath “as soon as possible” 
after the commencement of his term of office, and it expressly provides that this oath 
can be taken at the first or “at any other sitting of the Council”.35 Therefore, s 21 of 
the ODO,36 which disqualifies a lawmaker for declining or neglecting to take the oath 
“duly requested which he is required to take by this Part [IV of the ODO]”, only takes 
effect when s 19--also in Part IV of the ODO--is flouted. This means that a lawmaker 
will only be disqualified after he declines or neglects to take the oath required by s 19 
of the ODO, ie, he declines or neglects to take a valid LegCo Oath as soon as 
																																								 																				
31 The corresponding term of “forthwith” in the Chinese version of the Interpretation is “即”, which 
denotes “就/使” (will) or “立刻” (without delay).None of these terms means “自動” (ie, automatic). 
The phrase “即喪失就任該條所列相應公職的資格” mandates the consequence of disqualification for 
a culpable public official, but the Chinese text of the Interpretation does not mandate “automatic” 
disqualification. Therefore, it would not be inconsistent with the Chinese text for the disqualification to 
be carried out by the President of the LegCo expeditiously. 
32 Soanes and Stevenson (n 23 above).  
33 Chief Executive(n 1 above), [42]. 
34 Ibid.,[44]. 
35 Section 19 of the ODO. 
36 Section 21 of the ODO. 
reasonably possible37 after the commencement of his term of office. Therefore, it is 
clear that ss 19 and 21 of the ODO do not disqualify a lawmaker “automatically”38 on 
the first occasion where he declined to take the aforesaid oath. It is unfortunate that 
the CA did not explore the interpretive effect s 19 has on s 21 and the interplay 
between both statutory provisions.  
Third, the CA held that“[t]he principle of non-intervention in the internal process of 
LegCo cannot prevent the court from adjudicating on the consequence of a failure to 
meet the constitutional requirement”, 39  and therefore, it was for the courts to 
disqualify the two lawmakers after their oaths were deemed invalid.  
The principle of non-intervention in the internal process of LegCo was affirmed by 
the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative 
Council (No1).40 The CFA held that in construing and applying the provisions of the 
BL, it is necessary to apply concepts that are embedded in the common law, which 
include the principle that: 
“the courts will not intervene to rule on the regularity or irregularity of the 
internal processes of the legislature but will leave it to [the legislature to] 
determine exclusively for itself matters of this kind”.41 
On the facts in Leung Kwok Hung, two lawmakers had attempted to filibuster a 
legislative bill by moving over 1,300 amendments at the relevant LegCo debate. After 
33 hours into the debate, the President relied on r 92 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
LegCo (RoP),42 which provides that in any matter not provided for in the RoP, the 
practice and procedure to be followed in the LegCo shall be as decided by the 
President,43 to end the debate.  
The central issue before the CFA in Leung Kwok Hung was whether Art 73(1) of the 
BL, which empowers the LegCo to “enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with 
the provisions of [the BL] and legal procedures”,44 requires Hong Kong courts to 
exercise jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the RoP in the LegCo's law-making 
																																								 																				
37 In construing statutes, courts would avoid a construction that leads to an absurd result (an example 
of which is given above), since that is unlikely to be what the legislature intended: Francis Bennion and 
Oliver Jones (eds), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 6th ed., 2013) p 
869.Moreover, common law courts have often construed the phrase “as soon as possible” to mean 
“within a reasonable time”: See Hydraulic Engineering Co Ltd v McHaffie Goslett & Co(1878) 4 QBD 
670, 673;Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512, 522;R v Greenaway(1994) 12 CRNZ 103, 
106.Therefore, “as soon as possible” in s 19 of the ODO should mean “as soon as reasonably possible” 
and hence within “a reasonable time”. 
38 Chief Executive (n 1 above), [42]. 
39 Ibid., [31]. 
40 (2014) 17 HKCFAR 689. 
41 Ibid., [28]. 
42 Article 75(2) of the BL reads: “The rules of procedure of the Legislative Council shall be made by 
the Council on its own, provided that they do not contravene this Law.” 
43 Rule 92 of the RoP reads: 
“In any matter not provided for in these Rules of Procedure, the practice and procedure to be followed 
in the Council shall be such as may be decided by the President who may, if he thinks fit, be guided by 
the practice and procedure of other legislatures.” 
44 Article 73(1) of the BL reads: “The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region shall exercise the following powers and functions;․․․To enact, amend or repeal laws in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures”. 
process. Critically, the CFA noted that Art 73(1) of the BL does not address the 
question of whether any non-compliance with the “legal procedures” in the legislative 
process would invalidate the law that was enacted after such non-compliance.45 Since 
Art 73(1) of the BL is ambiguous on this point, the Court held that the constitutional 
provisions therein do not displace the common law principle of non-intervention.46 
Nevertheless, pursuant to a written constitution which confers law-making powers on 
the legislature, the judiciary will determine whether the legislature has a particular 
power or privilege,47 but they will not exercise jurisdiction to determine “the occasion 
or the manner of exercise”48 of such powers or privileges by the LegCo or its 
President.  
On this basis, the CFA in Leung Kwok Hung determined that the President had the 
power to terminate a debate, as this was inherent in his power granted under Art 72(1) 
of the BL to “preside over meetings”.49 But it was not for the Court to consider 
whether that power was exercised properly or whether the impugned decision to close 
the debate was an unauthorised making of a rule of procedure.50  
 In Leung Kwok Hung , notwithstanding that Art 73(1) of the BL explicitly requires 
the LegCo to “enact․․․laws in accordance with the provisions of [the BL] and legal 
procedures”, the CFA held that Art 73(1) was ambiguous on whether any non-
compliance with the “legal procedures” in the legislative process would invalidate the 
law that was enacted after such non-compliance.51 In view of this ambiguity, the 
Court held that the constitutional provisions therein do not displace the common law 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of LegCo.52 Where this principle 
applies, the judiciary will only determine whether the legislature has a particular 
power53--which on the facts was the power to terminate a legislative debate--and it 
will not exercise jurisdiction to determine “the occasion or the manner of exercise”54 
of such powers by the LegCo or its President.  
The principles laid out in Leung Kwok Hung are apposite herein. Just as Art 73(1) of 
the BL is ambiguous on whether any non-compliance with the “legal procedures” in 
the legislative process would invalidate any legislation that was enacted after such 
non-compliance, Art 104 of the BL55 and the relevant NPCSC Interpretation are 
ambiguous on whether Hong Kong courts are required to enforce the adverse 
																																								 																				
45 Leung Kwok Hung (n 40above), [36]. 
46 Ibid., [38]. 
47 Ibid., [39]. 
48 Ibid., [43]. 
49 Ibid.,[46]. Article 72(1) of the BL reads: “The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the following powers and functions:․․․To preside 
over meetings”. 
50 Leung Kwok Hung (n 40above), [46]. 
51 Ibid., [36]. 
52 Ibid., [38]. 
53 Ibid., [39]. 
54 Ibid., [43]. 
55 Article 104 of the BL reads: 
“When assuming office, the Chief Executive, principal officials, members of the Executive Council 
and of the Legislative Council, judges of the courts at all levels and other members of the judiciary in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must, in accordance with law, swear to uphold the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and 
swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.” 
consequences that follow from an invalid LegCo Oath. In view of this ambiguity, 
these provisions do not displace the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of LegCo. Therefore, whilst the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether 
the President has the general power to grant or deny a newly elected LegCo member 
the opportunity to retake the requisite oath after the original attempt was judicially 
deemed invalid, the courts will not exercise jurisdiction to determine the specific 
occasion or manner of exercise of this power by the President.  
It is our view that the BL and the RoP confer on the President this aforesaid power to 
grant or deny a newly elected LegCo member the opportunity to retake the requisite 
oath. First, as discussed earlier, s 19 of the ODO merely imposes on a LegCo member 
the duty to take a valid LegCo Oath as soon as reasonably possible after his term of 
office begins; it also provides that this valid LegCo Oath may be taken at the “first 
sitting” or “any other sitting” of the LegCo.56 Therefore, s 19 clearly contemplates 
that a LegCo Oath can be re-administered at another sitting if a valid one was not 
taken at the first sitting of the LegCo. Second, Art 72(2) of the BL empowers the 
President to “decide on the agenda”.57 Thus, the President is conferred with the 
general power to determine that the legislative agenda should or should not include 
the re-administration of the LegCo Oath for its members. Third, since neither the 
ODO nor the RoP specifies the time limit for a LegCo member to take a valid oath, 
save that it must be taken within a reasonable time,58 r 92 of the RoP applies. As 
mentioned, r 92 of the RoP provides that the practice and procedure to be followed in 
LegCo for any matter not provided for in the RoP shall be decided by the President.59 
Therefore, the President is conferred with the general power to decide--in accordance 
with the Interpretation, the ODO and the RoP--the practice and procedure to be 
followed when determining if the LegCo Oath can be re-administered.  
Hence, once it is determined that the President has this general power, it is not for the 
courts to exercise jurisdiction to determine “the occasion or the manner of exercise”60 
of this power. Therefore, even if the Interpretation provides that no arrangements 
shall be made for retaking the oath after the oath taken is determined as invalid, it is 
not for the courts to determine, on behalf of the President, that this “occasion” does 
not warrant the re-administration of the oath, nor is it for the courts to dictate the 
“manner” by which the refusal to re-administer the oath should be performed by the 
President.  
The interplay between Art 104 of the BL, the NPCSC and the ODO raises two 
separate and conceptually distinct issues and, with respect, the CA has conflated both. 
The first concerns the consequence for legislators if they intentionally decline to take 
the prescribed oath; the second pertains to which branch of government is tasked with 
enforcing any adverse consequence that follows from an invalid oath. The 
Interpretation has made it clear that the consequence of the abovementioned 
misconduct is disqualification. But one must note that the Interpretation is actually 
																																								 																				
56 Section 19 of the ODO. 
57 Article 72(2) of the BL reads: 
“The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall 
exercise the following powers and functions:․․․To decide on the agenda, giving priority to government 
bills for inclusion in the agenda”. 
58 See discussion in note 37 on s 19 of the ODO. 
59 Rule 92 of the RoP. 
60 Leung Kwok Hung (n 40 above), [43]. 
silent on whether the judiciary has to be the branch of government that disqualifies a 
lawmaker after his oath is deemed invalid.61 Therefore, neither Art 104 of the BL nor 
the Interpretation displaces the principle of non-intervention in the internal process of 
LegCo on the latter issue. Furthermore, the Interpretation is also silent on whether it 
applies retrospectively to events that predated its announcement, an issue we will now 
examine.  
3. Retrospectivity of the NPCSC Interpretation 
 The CA held that the question of whether the NPCSC Interpretation applies 
retrospectively “cannot and does not arise”, 62  because “the Interpretation, by 
definition, sets out the true and proper meaning of art.104 from day one”.63 An 
implicit assumption in the CA's ruling seems to be that NPCSC Interpretations 
operate in the same way as common law decisions: when the NPCSC delegates issue 
an Interpretation, they are acting as common law judges who merely declare what the 
relevant BL provision has always meant from its inception. Underpinning this 
assumption is the declaratory theory of judicial decisions, where the common law is 
seen as “an immutable body of doctrine existing from time immemorial”,64 waiting to 
be discovered and declared by judges who do not make or change it.65 Therefore, 
when a new judicial proposition is announced, the law is revealed but not changed at 
all.66 It follows that if NPCSC Interpretations function in Hong Kong in the same way 
as common law judgments do, they should apply retrospectively.67  
 This approach was first adopted by the CFA when it grappled with the NPCSC's first 
post-handover Interpretation of the Basic Law. In 1999, following the CFA's 
landmark decision in Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration,68 the NPCSC issued an 
Interpretation69 of Arts 22(4)70 and 24(2)(3)71 of the BL. When the CFA had to decide 
																																								 																				
61 It is also noteworthy that Professor Albert Chen, an eminent pro-Beijing constitutional law scholar 
and member of Hong Kong Basic Law Committee--a political body that advises the NPCSC prior to 
the official issue of any Interpretation--has revealed publicly prior to the CFI's ruling that it was open 
to the Hong Kong courts to punt the issue over to the oath administrator at the LegCo: Jeffie Lam and 
Joyce Ng, “Hong Kong Courts Can Decide Fate of At Least 10 Lawmakers despite Beijing Ruling” 
South China Morning Post(11 November 2016), available at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/politics/article/2045224/hong-kong-courtscan-decide-fate-least-10-lawmakers-despite (visited 14 
January 2017). 
62 Chief Executive (n 1 above), [53]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Giannarelli v Wraith(1988) 165 CLR 543, 584-585.  
65 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, 358. 
66 Ibid. 
67 In Hong Kong, the issue of whether courts can overrule past decisions prospectively remains 
unresolved; but even if the courts can do so, “the circumstances must be so exceptional that the 
occasions when they would be held to exist would be very rare”: HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 
HKCFAR 614, [25] (Li CJ). 
68 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4. 
69 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Articles 22(4) 
and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress at its 
Tenth Session on 26 June 1999), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A106!en@1999-06-
26T00:00:00/longTitle?elpid=254021 (visited 17 March 2017). 
70 Article 22(4) of the BL reads: 
“For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must 
apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of 
on the temporal effect of that interpretation in Lau Kong Yung v Director of 
Immigration,72 it held that the Interpretation “dates from 1 July 1997 when the Basic 
Law came into effect”73 and “declared what the law has always been”.74 Later, in 
Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen,75 when the CFA was asked to interpret 
Art 24(2)(1) of the BL,76 it confined the “binding”77 effect of the Interpretation to just 
Arts 22(4) and 24(2)(3),78 even though one passage in the Interpretation suggests that 
it would govern Art 24(2)(1) as well.79 In doing so, the CFA once again treated an 
Interpretation as a judgment, “drawing an analogy between it and the concept of 
obiter dictum in the common law tradition”.80  
 Insofar as the CA has applied the Interpretation retrospectively to events that 
predated its announcement, it was bound by CFA precedents; therefore, we do not 
disagree with the Court's decision to do so. However, if the CFA would like to review 
this retrospectivity issue in the future, we would like to sketch out an alternative view 
for its consideration.  
Arguably, the Interpretation can be treated as a legislative enactment rather than a 
judicial decision. Albert Chen, a current and long-time member of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law Committee, has explained that an NPCSC Interpretation is “a legislative 
rather than judicial act”.81 Wang Zhenmin of Tsinghua University, a former member 
of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, has also argued that the NPCSC interprets 
laws in its capacity as a legislative body,82 and insofar as an NPCSC Interpretation 
overrides a constitutional decision made by Hong Kong courts, this is “not dissimilar 
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permanent residents and non-permanent residents. The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be: (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (2) Chinese citizens who have 
ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (3) Persons of Chinese nationality 
born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2)․․․”. 
72 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300. 
73 Ibid., 326D. 
74 Ibid. 
75 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211. 
76 Article 24(2)(1) of the BL reads: 
“Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Hong Kong residents”) shall include 
permanent residents and non-permanent residents. The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be: (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”. 
77 Chong Fung Yuen (n 75 above), 223D. 
78 Ibid., 223A-E. 
79 That relevant passage of the first NPCSC Interpretation reads: 
“The legislative intent as stated by this Interpretation, together with the legislative intent of all other 
categories of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC, have been reflected in the 
‘Opinions on the Implementation of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC 
’adopted at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR of the NPC on 
10 August 1996.” 
80  Albert HY Chen, “Another Case of Conflict between the CFA and the NPC Standing 
Committee?”(2001) 31 HKLJ 179, 185. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Zhenmin Wang, Zhongyang yu tebiexingzhengqu guanxi: yizhong fazhi jiegou de jieshi [The 
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to the overriding of precedents by legislation under common law systems”.83  
 Assuming that the NPCSC Interpretation is treated as a piece of legislation, and if 
Hong Kong courts were to approach this legislation using common law principles of 
statutory interpretation,84 the presumption against retrospectivity of legislation would 
apply. According to this presumption, unless a contrary intention appears, a 
legislative provision is presumed not to operate retrospectively,85 that is, to impair 
vested rights acquired under then-existing laws or to create a new obligation, duty or 
disadvantage in relation to past events,86 regardless of whether it is “penal in the sense 
of punishment”. 87  In determining whether a provision is intended to operate 
retrospectively, the courts will consider the possible degree of unfairness so caused; 
the greater the unfairness, the stronger the presumption that the legislature did not so 
intend.88 Therefore, penalties for non-compliance with the law, criminal or not,89 
should not be altered to the detriment of the wrongdoer after the wrong was 
committed, as that would be most unfair.90  
 On the facts, when Leung and Yau were first requested to take the LegCo Oath, the 
rules on oath taking were only set out in ss 19 and 21 of the ODO and Art 104 of the 
BL. But the Interpretation subsequently imposes an obligation on one to take the 
legislative oath in a manner specified in the Interpretation,91 prescribes a penalty of 
“forthwith”92 disqualification if one declines to take the oath,93 and denies the oath 
taker another opportunity of re-taking the oath if the prior oath has been deemed 
invalid. 94  All of the above requirements are additional to the statutory and 
constitutional obligations expressly laid out in the ODO and the BL. On 12 October 
2016, nobody would have understood from the pre-existing statutory and 
constitutional provisions that the consequences for declining to take the legislative 
oath would be so severe, as hitherto these consequences simply did not exist.  
Nor is there any contrary intention in the Interpretation itself to rebut this 
presumption. We must highlight that the Interpretation is actually silent on whether it 
applies retrospectively to oaths already taken. If the NPCSC had intended to make the 
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Interpretation retrospective, it could have easily expressed its intention in the text. For 
example, the NPCSC's first Interpretation expressly provides that whilst it does not 
affect the legal rights acquired by the parties under Ng Ka Ling ,“․․․the question 
whether any other person fulfils the conditions prescribed by Article 24(2)(3) of the 
Basic Law․․․shall be determined by reference to this Interpretation”,95 thus implying 
that the first Interpretation was intended to have retrospective effect. In contrast, this 
Interpretation is silent on its temporal effect. Neither do the NPCSC's Explanations on 
the Draft Interpretation,96 if admissible at all, evince any unambiguous intention that 
the Interpretation applies retrospectively. Therefore, the presumption against 
retrospectivity is not displaced, and if the Interpretation is viewed as a piece of 
legislation, it should not operate retrospectively to events that predated its 
announcement.  
4. Conclusion 
 Assuming that this NPCSC Interpretation has retrospective effect, the political fates 
of Leung and Yau would be the same even if the CA had passed the buck to the 
President. But by not participating in the legislators' inglorious removal from office, 
the Hong Kong courts would have preserved their image as the guardian of the city's 
civil liberties and warded off criticisms that it had now become an enabler of the 
executive government's political agenda.97 More importantly, one should note that this 
court victory has emboldened the Hong Kong government, which has now gone to 
court to seek the removal of four additional pro-democracy lawmakers. 98  By 
unilaterally disqualifying the lawmakers, the Hong Kong judiciary has unwittingly 
opened the floodgates to more (unnecessary) litigation and embroiled itself in more 
political controversy. 
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